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CEO pay and voting dissent before and
after the crisis
Ian Gregory-Smith∗, Steve Thompson and Peter W. Wright
For the attention of the typesetter: CEO pay and voting dissent
Say on pay - that is empowering shareholders to vote on the remuneration ar-
rangements of their firm’s senior executives - has become an international policy
response to the perceived explosion in rewards for top management. In this paper
we examine the operation of say in pay in the UK, the country which pioneered its
adoption, using the population of non-investment trust companies in the FTSE
350 over the period 2003-2012. We find executive remuneration and dissent on
the remuneration committee report are positively correlated. However, the mag-
nitude of this effect is small.We find that dissent plays a role in moderating future
executive compensation levels, although this effect is restricted to levels of dissent
above 10%, and primarily acting upon the higher quantiles of rewards. We find
no evidence of an increased restraining effect of dissent on pay following the onset
of the financial crisis.
JEL codes: G30, J30
Since the late 1970s, the increasing level of compensation for senior executives world-
wide, relative to average earnings, has been a spectacular empirical regularity.2 Be-
ginning in the USA and UK, the growth in executive rewards spread across the globe,
∗Corresponding author: i.gregory-smith@sheffield.ac.uk; Department of Economics, The University
of Sheffield, 9 Mappin Street, Sheffield, S1 4DT, UK. Tel: +44(0)114 222 3458
2Hill (2012, p.221-2)) documents the convergent trends in executive remuneration despite the per-
sistence of cultural differences between countries, as reflected in the design of executive contracts.
1
initially to Europe and latterly to developing countries, including recently the BRIC
economies of China (Conyon and Ho, 2012), India (Chakrabarti et al., 2012) and Brazil.3
This growth has been accompanied by widespread debates - both academic and pop-
ular - on its causes and consequences. These, in turn, have helped shape a corporate
governance reform process whose international diffusion is almost as marked as that of
executive pay growth itself.
Corporate governance changes, and those to financial regulation in general, tend to
follow financial and business crises (Murphy, 2012; Hill, 2012). Mostly recently, the
global financial crisis appears to have stimulated the adoption of ‘say on pay’ in the
USA, Europe and beyond. Say on pay involves the direct empowerment of shareholders
in the determination of executive compensation arrangements in their company. This
move rests, explicitly or implicitly, on some version of the ‘rents capture’ hypothesis
of corporate control. That is, the proposition of Bebchuk and Fried (2004) and others
that suggests executives ‘capture’ their boards sufficiently to push their own rewards
beyond purely market-determined levels. It is consequently assumed that self-interested
shareholders will, if offered a low-cost opportunity to voice their concerns, vote to
punish excess and that executives, fearful of such retribution, will curtail their own
opportunism. Since 2007-2008, numerous countries have either adopted say on pay
schemes or strengthened existing ones. These moves have been widely linked to the
view that executive pay arrangements encouraged excessive risk-taking, particularly
in financial services, and/or protected senior managers from the consequences of such
behaviour (Hill, 2012).
Since the UK adopted say on pay in 2003 - almost the first country to do so -it offers
a particularly useful test-case on the impact of shareholder voice in pay determination.
3The Economist (27/1/2011) recently reported that the executives of large companies in
Sao Paulo, Brazil, were paid even more than their equivalents in New York and London.
http://www.economist.com/node/18010831 viewed on 7/09/2012.
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This paper explores the role of shareholder voting in executive pay setting using the
population of (non-investment trust) companies in the FTSE 350 over the period 2003-
2012. Unlike prior studies (e.g. Conyon and Sadler, 2010; Ferri and Maber, 2012) which
use data covering the boom period up to 2007 only, when support for the status quo
was perhaps unsurprising, we incorporate the post-crisis years up to and including
the so-called ‘shareholder spring’4 votes of 2011-12 votes. Our analysis of shareholder
voting suggests that dissent from the remuneration committee’s proposals is positively
correlated with the level of remuneration. However, the magnitude of this effect remains
small, a result consistent with the observed rarity of board defeats on this issue.
Turning to the role of dissent in moderating future executive compensation levels, a more
complex picture emerges. While there is a negative correlation between remuneration
and the previous year’s dissent, this appears to be restricted to levels of dissent above
10%, and primarily acting upon the higher quantiles of rewards. Lower levels of lagged
dissent may even encourage higher payments, particularly for those in the higher pay
quantiles. Contrary to the media view of a ‘shareholder spring’ response to the global
crisis, we find no evidence of an structural break in the pay-dissent relationship after
2007.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 1. examines say on pay in the context of
the debates over executive remuneration and explores the UK institutional setting. Sec-
tion 2. outlines the sample and data before presenting empirical analyses of shareholder
voting and executive remuneration. A brief conclusion follows.
4Media comment likened the several votes that rejected remuneration committee reports, so over-
turning the board’s wishes, to the ‘Arab spring’ of 2010-12 which has seen the overthrow of dictatorial
regimes across N Africa- see ‘Boards wake up to a shareholder spring’, Financial Times 4/5/2012
accessed at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a284e414-95ee-11e1-a163-00144feab49a.html, viewed
on 7/09/2012.
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1. Say on Pay and Executive Compensation after the Crisis
The notion that shareholders in a public company should ratify - or even be cognisant
with - the rewards of that company’s senior executives is a comparatively recent develop-
ment in corporate evolution. Transparency in the disclosure of remuneration developed
slowly. In the USA, for example, it took a series of well-publicised cases of executive
salary excess in the aftermath of the Wall Street crash before any mandatory salary
and bonus disclosure was introduced, and then only in stages between 1933 and 1935
(see Murphy, 2012, pp.33-34). In the UK disclosure was minimal until a series of cor-
porate governance reforms, beginning with the adoption of the Cadbury report in 1992,
gradually extended transparency across the executives’ total reward package.
In contrast to the gradual adoption of rewards disclosure, the diffusion of say on pay
- that is allowing shareholders a direct voice on senior executive remuneration - has
been spectacular. Prior to 2003, when the UK introduced a mandatory non-binding
shareholder vote, largely as a by-product of a move to curb perceived overly-generous
compensation for ousted CEOs (Conyon and Sadler, 2010), open shareholder involve-
ment in pay was practically unknown. In the subsequent decade, non-binding votes have
been adopted in the USA, much of the European Union, Australia, and Canada and
beyond. Binding votes are now in place in the Netherlands and Scandinavia (Norway,
Sweden and Denmark), in Australia for severance awards and under serious consider-
ation elsewhere, including in the UK.5 Moreover, the formal impact of a shareholder
ballot is not necessarily limited to any majority verdict outcome. In recognition that
voting results will tend to favour the status quo, some countries provide for sanctions
if dissent reaches levels well below 50%. In Australia, for example, two successive votes
of 25% or more against the remuneration recommendations trigger an automatic vote
5Business Secretary Vince Cable announced plans for manda-
tory binding votes and further reward disclosure in June 2012, see:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304765304577478172485959522.html
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of confidence in the board of directors (Thomas, 2012, p.253).
1.1. Say on Pay and the Executive Pay Debate
Much of the academic debate surrounding the growth in executive remuneration over
the past thirty years has polarised around two positions, the optimal contracting view
and the managerial power - or rents extraction - school. The former emphasises the
role of executive employment contracts, particularly at CEO level, in reconciling the
interests of principal-shareholders and their agent-managers. On this view, following
Jensen and Murphy (1990), it is not the level of CEO rewards that should generate
concern but their relationship to firm performance and ultimately shareholder value.
Regulatory, fiscal, political or other impediments to the use of performance-related re-
muneration are seen as inhibiting the adoption of an efficient value-maximising contract.
In contrast the managerial power view, most comprehensively developed by Bebchuk and Fried
(2003, 2004), considers that rent-seeking senior executives ‘capture’ the remuneration-
setting process, usually via compliant non-executive board members. The Bebchuk-
Fried model suggests executives maximise remuneration subject to an ‘outrage’ con-
straint (Weisbach, 2007). While the precise nature of this constraint is not made
explicit, they suggest it is the potential hostility among the firm’s shareholders that
most directly constrains managers, not least as these shareholders become motivated to
support challenges to the board and to endorse actions that may embarrass managers.
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) comment:
‘The more outrage a compensation arrangement is expected to generate,
the more reluctant directors will be to approve it and the more hesitant
managers will be to propose it in the first place.’(p.5)
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As Sheehan (2012) observes, the optimal contracting and managerial power perspectives
generate very different responses to say on pay. On the former view (e.g. Jensen and Meckling,
1992) not merely does the board hire executives on the shareholders’ behalf, but such
a division of responsibilities is seen as efficient in freeing shareholders from the need to
acquire and process the information needed to reward and monitor executives. Indeed,
from Berle and Means (1932) onward, direct shareholder action was considered domi-
nated by the free-rider inertia position or by exit for shareholders in large firms who
have access to liquid stock markets.
By contrast, voting outcomes may be problematic. Critics of say on pay (e.g. Armstrong et al.,
2013) argue that ex post contractual ratification by shareholders may risk damaging the
hiring process and introduces uncertainty into executive rewards. They suggest this will
tend to increase remuneration as new hires seek a risk premium against the possibil-
ity of a negative vote.6 Similarly, they argue rewards across the managerial hierarchy
may be distorted where only those of the most senior executives are the subject of a
ballot. Armstrong et al. (2013) cite a negative stock price reaction to the introduction
of say on pay in the USA as confirmation that the policy is not generally supportive of
shareholders’ interests.
In contrast, under the managerial power view, the introduction of say on pay is a rel-
atively low-cost means of strengthening the outrage constraint, especially if the vote is
binding and if disclosure is sufficiently detailed for external scrutiny to penetrate any
‘camouflage’ or obfuscation that obscures non-cash pay elements (Bebchuk and Fried,
2003, 2004). While a similar outcome could be obtained by a shareholder vote against
individual directors or even the entire slate, such a move would be more obviously
destabilising and hence more costly in terms of shareholder wealth. Nor need share-
holders experience high information costs and a corresponding free-rider problem. Proxy
6Peters and Wagner (2011) report evidence of a compensating differential in CEO remuneration
attached to the estimated probability of executive dismissal.
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consultants and corporate governance advisers may supply institutional shareholders,
covering the bulk of each firm’s equity ownership, with unbiased voting advice based
on comparative assessments of reward and performance.
Other contributors to the debate recognise the potential for a conflict of interest be-
tween shareholders and CEO, without necessarily subscribing to the ‘outrage’ con-
straint. Holmstro¨m (2005), for example, considers the practice of benchmarking within
reasonable norms as more important than outrage in limiting CEO compensation. He
regards the board and CEO as separate, if not necessarily equal, decision takers. Faced
with a powerful and demanding CEO he suggests that board members will typically use
external comparators, e.g. compensation surveys and consultants’ recommendations, to
determine the level of remuneration. (Indeed, he suggests that the primacy of external
comparisons results in a level of compensation that is likely to be closer to the CEO’s
reservation position than that of the shareholders.) On such a view, the introduction
of say on pay would appear likely to further strengthen the board vis-a`-vis the CEO.
1.2. Say on Pay: Before the Crisis
In both the UK and Australia, the first countries to implement say on pay, it was
quickly apparent that the overwhelming majority of ballot outcomes -approximately
99% - favoured the status quo (Sheehan, 2007a,b) with rare defeats for the board tending
to be reserved for the most egregious examples of bad practice (Thompson, 2005). In
each country the proportion of ‘no’ votes cast was similarly small, typically averaging
less than 4%.7 Since institutional shareholders, generally locked in to a relatively large
holding, may be reluctant to vote against and thereby possibly destabilise management,
most analyses have included abstentions in the count of dissenting votes. On this basis
7This is, however, almost twice the level of opposition expressed in general company resolutions
over the same period- See Conyon and Sadler (2010).
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both Australia and the UK averaged about 8% of dissent prior to 2008.
The initial studies of the determinants of shareholder voting, reviewed in Yermack
(2010), suggested a strictly limited impact for executive pay. Carter and Zamora (2009)
and Conyon and Sadler (2010) estimated voting models on overlapping samples of UK
companies up to 2006 and 2007, respectively. Both reported a statistically significant, if
small, impact of (the log of) executive compensation on dissent. Each study also found
a negative performance effect, with expressed dissent lower in better performing com-
panies, suggesting that shareholders use say on pay votes to punish, or at least express
frustration at, currently unsuccessful executives. Conyon and Sadler (2010) analysed
voting on all pay resolutions, not merely votes on the remuneration committee report.
Their results also suggested that investors are less likely to support pay resolutions on
option, LTIP or equity grants than they are for other pay or non-pay resolutions, a
result suggestive of some fears of ‘camouflage.’
The underlying expectation of a say on pay policy is clearly that actual or potential
shareholder dissent should curb pay excesses. Initial evidence on the impact of dissent on
subsequent pay was suggestive of at most a very limited effect. Tabulations by Sheehan
(2007b) revealed no effect while a comparison of sub-periods 2000-02 and 2003-05, before
and after the UK’s introduction of shareholder votes, by Ferri and Maber (2012) found
no immediate effect on either the level or growth rate of CEO remuneration. However,
they did report an increased CEO pay-performance sensitivity, particularly with respect
to poor performance. This greater sensitivity they find to be more pronounced in
companies with a high level of dissent in 2003 and where CEOs appear to be over-paid in
the first sub-period.8 Initial results from augmenting executive remuneration regressions
with a lagged dissent variable (Carter and Zamora, 2009; Conyon and Sadler, 2010)
8They recognise that their results may conflate the effects of say on pay’s introduction with those
of other contemporaneous changes, particularly those intended to curb pay-offs to ousted executives.
To explore this further they use US corporations and AIM-listed (i.e. smaller) UK companies as
comparator groups and still find greater sensitivity.
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failed to reveal any general significant inhibiting effect.
1.3. Evidence post-crisis
Until 2008, the overall economic environment was sufficiently benign that it is perhaps
unsurprising that broad assent to board policies, including those on executive remu-
neration, should be the shareholders’ default position. However, it has been plausibly
argued (e.g. Hill, 2012) that this changed dramatically with the onset of the global
financial crisis:
First, compensation systems in financial services have been widely, if controversially
blamed for encouraging excessive risk taking and thereby helping to precipitate the
banking collapse (see Bebchuk and Spamann (2010), Bell and Van Reenen (2010), but
also Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011).) In many countries this has produced hostile polit-
ical and media interest in high pay in general.
Second, shareholder activism - which in practice means institutional investor activism
- has been actively promoted as a response to the perceived failings of the boom years.
In the UK the Financial Reporting Council (FRC, 2010a,b) adopted the ‘Stewardship
Code’, as recommended by the Walker (2009) Review of financial institutional behaviour
leading up to the crisis. The Code, largely mirrored by the overall UK Corporate
Governance Code, seeks to place responsibility for monitoring on institutional investors
and to require these to act collectively to promote good corporate governance, including
explicitly acting on executive remuneration (FRC, 2010b, p.1). The investors are also
required, on a ‘comply or explain’ basis, to engage with their companies on such matters.
There is some evidence that the introduction of say on pay had increased the dialogue
between investors and their companies even before the crisis. Davis (2008) reports on
an institutional survey which suggested that remuneration related contacts between
9
UK companies and their large institutional investors increased three-fold from 2003 to
2006. His interviews led him to conclude that, from 2003, the remuneration commit-
tee’s need to produce a package to convince shareholders rather than convincing the
board increased the frequency of remuneration committee meetings, the contacts with
investors, and the use of professional advisers. He also reports, in support of Holm-
stro¨m’s position, that some remuneration committee chairs welcomed the advisory vote
as a means of standing up to overbearing CEOs (p.11).
Third, the role of the media in shaping perceptions of CEO remuneration is well doc-
umented (Dyck and Zingales, 2002; Core et al., 2008) and media hostility to perceived
pay excesses in the post-crisis period would be expected to create a fertile climate for
publicising individual cases of such excess. Jensen (1979) observed that the role of the
mass media is perhaps best considered as provider of entertainment not information,
leading to a news treatment which is both selective and biased towards topical prejudice.
It seems likely that the threat - or still worse the reality - of extensive media criticism
might be expected to increase shareholder hostility to overly-generous pay awards.
Finally, perhaps in reflection of the heightened media interest in executive pay9, share-
holders’ hostility to remuneration committee reports has itself received greater publicity.
The media coined the term ‘shareholder spring’ - by analogy to the ‘Arab spring’, or
popular uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East in 2011-12 - to denote share-
holder activism and the expression, at least, has received widespread usage. This has
left at least the perception that shareholders adopted a more hawkish position in the
post-crisis environment.
9Articles in the UK National Press discussing ‘executive pay’ rose from less than 550 in 2006 and
2007 to 832 in 2008 and more than 1000 in all subsequent years (source: Newsbank).
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2. Shareholder Dissent in the UK
2.1. The Dataset
The dataset used in this study was supplied by Manifest Information Services Ltd and
comprises all companies that entered the FTSE 350 Index with any financial year end
between 31st December 1998 and 31st March 2012.10 The dataset records the service
dates of each director and full remuneration details.11 Importantly for this study, it also
includes details of votes cast at company annual general meetings (AGMs). Additional
data items were obtained from Thomson Datastream. Full descriptions are contained
in the Appendix.
Total remuneration was defined as salary and cash bonus, if any, plus the value of
options and equity incentives granted in financial year t. Executive stock options
(ESOs) have frequently been valued as European call options using some version of
the Black and Scholes (1973) model, for example in Conyon et al. (2011). There are
two potential difficulties with this in the present context: First, as Murphy (1999)
showed, the ESOs breach many of the Black-Scholes assumptions. Perhaps the most
important violation occurs through executives holding undiversified financial and hu-
man capital in their own firms. This drives a wedge between the option cost to the firm
and the option value to its recipient, with the latter number depending on the individ-
ual’s (subjective) coefficient of risk aversion. Second, since the implementation of the
Greenbury report in the UK in the late 1990s, simple ESOs have been largely replaced
by long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). These typically provide stock grants subject to
performance criteria, very often involving benchmarking against industry competitors.
10To avoid survivorship bias, companies that drop out of the index prior to 2008 are included in our
coverage until the company is wound up or taken private. Investment trusts that contained no executive
directors were excluded from the sample, although self-managed investment trusts were retained.
11Although the database does include some data on pensions, it it poor for the early years, making
it unsuitable for use in this study.
11
They also display considerable idiosyncracies with respect to vesting conditions, making
the application of standardised valuation criteria potentially inappropriate. Given the
absence of readily available Black-Scholes values for UK options, we have followed the
arguments of Gregory-Smith (2012) and used the simplification of valuing all equity
incentives granted in year t at one third of their corresponding equity value at the grant
date.12
2.2. The UK Institutional Setting
Companies are required by UK listing rules to hold an AGM at least once every 15
months (Companies Act, 1985), but companies rarely deviate from the best practice of
holding an AGM every 12 months. At the AGM, shareholders are asked to approve res-
olutions proposed by the board. Until 2003, votes on the the remuneration report were
on a voluntary basis only. From 2004, the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations
(Department of Trade and Industry, 2002) required companies incorporated under UK
company law to hold a vote on the report of the directors’ remuneration committee,
although this vote remained non-binding. Details on voting are presented in Figure 1
and Table 1.
It is clear from the Figure 1, the average level of dissent on the remuneration committee
report13 remained low over the entire period, although there is an apparent increase in
dissent from 2001-3 and again from 2007. Both of these upswings follow periods of
extreme stock market turbulence i.e the bursting of the dot.com bubble in 2001 and
the onset of the global financial crisis in 2007-8. Although attributing the post 2001
12Gregory-Smith (2012) provides robustness checks which suggest that the one third face value
simplification offers both a reasonable approximation to adjusted Black-Scholes values, where full
information is available, and account for 97% of within-sample variation in Black-Scholes values among
70 sample companies.
13Votes cast as ‘Abstain’ are included in this measure, as an abstention is widely understood as an
expression of dissent.
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Fig. 1: Dissent against remuneration committee report 1998-2012
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Table 1: Remuneration Report Resolutions
Financial Remuneration % of Reports % of Reports % of Reports No. of Reports Average
Year Report voted Down less than 75% less than 90% less than 95% Turnout
Ending Resolutions approval approval approval
1998 9 0 0 11.1 33.3 33.5
1999 11 0 0 36.4 63.6 52.4
2000 17 0 5.9 17.6 41.2 46.2
2001 90 0 2.2 34.4 56.7 57.6
2002 285 0.4 11.9 45.6 66.7 57.1
2003 454 0.7 13 42.1 61.2 58.2
2004 443 0.7 7.4 25.1 47.6 60.4
2005 447 0.2 4.9 15.4 35.1 62.2
2006 457 0 4.4 17.9 37.6 63.8
2007 451 0.4 6 18.6 35.7 62.1
2008 454 0.9 9.5 24 37.2 66
2009 443 0.7 11.3 27.8 43.8 67.1
2010 450 0.7 11.3 29.6 46.4 69.8
2011 423 1.2 13.5 34.3 54.8 71.8
2012∗ 33 0 12.1 30.3 54.5 70.8
Notes:
1. Proposals of the remuneration report became mandatory for UK incorporated and London Stock Exchange listed
companies with the financial year ending on or after 31 December 2002.
2. ∗ 2012 figures are up to and including 31st March 2012.
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upswing in dissent to financial turbulence is potentially muddied by the introduction of
mandatory proposals on compensation in 2002, the increase post 2007 does not suffer
from such conflating factors. It is this upswing and the impact that it has on subsequent
remuneration which is the primary interest of this paper.
Table 1 shows that there has been a steady increase in shareholder representation at
AGMs over the period, with representation more than doubling from 1998 to 2012.
It might be thought that, post 2007, high levels of dissent and high levels of turnout
reflect two facets of increased shareholder activism. However, this does not appear to
be the case. The increase in turnout appears to be a general trend, and there is no
discernible correlation between high turnout and high dissent (See the left hand side
panel of Figure 2).
It is also interesting to note at this juncture that the increased activism post 2007 has
not actually raised dissent to unprecedented levels, but simply returned it to the levels
that prevailed in 2002-3. Even at these peaks, dissent is still low in absolute terms. It
is also important to realise that, even in the years of high average dissent, the incidence
of reports actually voted down remains extremely rare.14
Very high rates of dissent on the remuneration committee report appear to coincide
with a more widely felt unhappiness amongst shareholders, with Figure 2 showing the
resulting positive correlation between dissent on pay and dissent more widely defined.15
Indeed, closer inspection of the defeated remuneration reports (Table 2) indicates that
such defeats appear to reflect dissatisfaction at major breaches of best practice by
management.16 This would suggest that when examining the consequences for CEO
14From 1998 to 2012 only 22 of 4467 reports are voted down.
15The estimated bivariate regression coefficient is 1.0998 with a standard error of 0.0462.
16For example, in the case of GlaxoSmithKline the major concern lay with the ‘parachute clauses’
which would have provided generous compensation for the CEO should the company be taken-over
(Thompson, 2005). Particularly interesting is the case of United Business Media, in which the retired
CEO (Lord Hollick) returned his bonus to the company after anger had been expressed by shareholders.
This is very similar to the case cited by Bebchuk and Fried (2004), in which the former CEO of General
14
Fig. 2: Pay dissent, non-pay dissent and voter turnout
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outcomes, considering levels of remuneration disapproval lower than 50% would be
appropriate, since then more variation over time is apparent (Table 1).
We next explore how voting dissent is correlated with other firm specific factors. The
data is ordered such that voting results are associated with the most recently completed
financial year i.e. votes cast for a meeting in May 2007 are typically associated with
financial years running 1 January 2006 - 31 December 2006 and so t would equal 2006
in this case. It is apparent from Table 3 column(1) that, as might be expected, voting
dissent is lower when shareholder returns in the previous financial year were high.
Interestingly, firm specific governance factors appear to have limited impact on dissent.
The percentage of directors on the board judged to be ‘insiders’, which might be an-
ticipated to cause concern amongst shareholders, does not appear to correlated with
higher dissent. The number of executive and non-executive directors and the size of the
Electric (Jack Welch) also gave up some of his post-retirement benefits in response to shareholder
outrage.
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Table 2: Voted Down Remuneration Reports 2002-2012
Company Year End % Dissent1 Principal Issue Consequence
GlaxoSmithKline 31 Dec 2002 63.15% CEO’s parachute clause2 Remuneration Committee replaced
CEO termination provisions reduced
Aegis Group 31 Dec 2003 52.38% 24 month service contracts2 CEO resigned, contracts reduced
Baltimore 31 Dec 2003 60.83% A major shareholder was contesting control of the company n/a
Eurotunnel 31 Dec 2003 67.04% A major shareholder was contesting control of the company n/a
Lonmin 30 Sep 2004 56.08% £500,000 ex-gratia bonus None
to a retiring non-executive
MFI Furniture Group 25 Dec 2004 60.46% 18 months liquidated Provisions removed
damages parachute clause2
United Business Media 31 Dec 2004 87.22% £250,000 retirement bonus CEO voluntarily handed back bonus
Croda International 31 Dec 2005 55.09% Weak LTIP targets3 More stretching targets adopted.
Bellway 31 Jul 2008 61.58% Bonuses paid despite not hitting targets Future arrangements more objective
albeit some discretion remains
RBS 31 Dec 2008 91.50% Large pension for outgoing CEO Pension arrangements negotiated down
alongside a £40bn loss in exchange for a lump sum payment
Shell 31 Dec 2008 60.10% Bonuses paid despite not hitting targets Bonus clawback introduced
Provident Financial 31 Dec 2008 53.47% CEO Pay increase & weak bonus conditions Bonus clawback introduced
Centamin 30 June 2009 52.51% Inadequate remuneration disclosure None
Grainger 30 Sep 2009 54.20% £3M Termination payment None
SIG 31 Dec 2009 69.68% Salary increase amid poor performance Salary freeze in subsequent year
EasyJet 30 Sep 2010 54.96% A major shareholder was contesting control of the company n/a
Afren 31 Dec 2010 59.81% Inadequate remuneration disclosure Amendments made but still attracts high dissent
Centamin 31 Dec 2011 64.15% Bonuses paid despite not hitting targets Discretion clause removed
WPP 31 Dec 2011 59.63% Quantum of CEO pay None
AVIVA 31 Dec 2011 58.57% Poor performance CEO resigns
Pendragon 31 Dec 2011 67.78% Increased bonus caps Caps reduced to prior levels
Cairn Energy 31 Dec 2011 70.05% Chairman’s Incentive pay None
1. % dissent includes both against votes and abstentions as a percentage of the total. In the cases above, the percentage against exceeded the percentage for.
2. The Combined Code recommends that the CEO’s contract should provide for no more than 12 months’ salary.
3. Although “against” votes exceeded “for” votes, the resolution was passed on a show of hands at the company meeting. As such, Croda managed to avoid coverage in
the business press.
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Table 3: Voting dissent, pay and performance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Break 2008 Break 2009 Break 2010
ln(total remuneration) 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Total shareholder return (TSR) -0.014** -0.013 -0.011 -0.009
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
ln(sales) -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
% insiders -0.014 0.006 -0.006 -0.005
(0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
no. non-exec directors -0.002 -0.004** -0.003* -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
no. exec directors 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ln(total remuneration)*post break interaction 0.001 0.001 -0.000
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
TSR*post break interaction -0.003 -0.006 -0.021
(0.013) (0.014) (0.017)
ln(sales)*post break interaction -0.003 -0.007* -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
% insiders*post break interaction -0.051 -0.021 -0.035
(0.039) (0.043) (0.045)
no. non-exec directors*post break interaction 0.004 0.004 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
no. exec directors*post break interaction -0.004 -0.003 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant -0.129*** -0.159*** -0.168*** -0.148***
(0.047) (0.053) (0.052) (0.051)
Observations 4,090 4,090 4,090 4,090
R-squared 0.044 0.048 0.047 0.046
1. The dependent variable, dissent, is the total number of against and abstain votes divided by the number of votes
cast at the meeting.
2. Robust Standard errors in parentheses
3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4. Total remuneration comprises salary, perks, bonuses and a grant date value of options and equity incentives.
5. Total remuneration is annualized if the CEO did not serve 12 months in the reporting period
6. Year dummies included
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Table 4: Voting dissent, pay and performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Quantile Quantile
Break 2008
10 25 50 75 90 10 25 50 75 90
ln(total remuneration) 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.016*** 0.023*** 0.030*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.015*** 0.023*** 0.033**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.014)
Total shareholder return (TSR) 0.001 0.001 -0.008** -0.020** -0.052*** 0.002 0.001 -0.010** -0.029** -0.050**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.008) (0.016) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.012) (0.025)
ln(sales) 0.001*** 0.001 0.000 -0.005** -0.010** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001 -0.003 -0.011
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007)
no. non-exec directors -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.004** -0.007* 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.005* -0.011**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005)
no. exec directors 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.001** 0.001*** 0.002 0.003 0.007
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005)
% insiders 0.004 0.003 0.000 -0.040 -0.062 0.004 0.007 0.013 -0.008 -0.025
(0.003) (0.005) (0.011) (0.025) (0.050) (0.004) (0.007) (0.014) (0.034) (0.070)
ln(total remuneration)*post break interaction 0.000 0.004** 0.007* -0.002 -0.013
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.010) (0.020)
TSR*post break interaction -0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.003 0.015
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.017) (0.035)
ln(sales)*post break interaction -0.000 -0.002* -0.004* -0.006 -0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.011)
no. non-exec directors*post break interaction -0.001** 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.013
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.008)
no. exec directors*post break interaction 0.000 -0.001 -0.003* -0.010** -0.008
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.009)
% insiders*post break interaction 0.001 -0.010 -0.035 -0.103* -0.022
(0.006) (0.010) (0.021) (0.053) (0.107)
Constant -0.127*** -0.151*** -0.191*** -0.079 0.054 -0.117*** -0.132*** -0.145*** -0.070 0.085
(0.007) (0.012) (0.025) (0.058) (0.116) (0.009) (0.015) (0.032) (0.079) (0.161)
Observations 4,090 4,090 4,090 4,090 4,090 4,090 4,090 4,090 4,090 4,090
1. The dependent variable, dissent, is the total number of against and abstain votes divided by the number of votes cast at the meeting.
2. Robust Standard errors in parentheses
3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4. Total remuneration comprises salary, perks, bonuses and a grant date value of options and equity incentives.
5. Total remuneration is annualized if the CEO did not serve 12 months in the reporting period
6. Year dummies included
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firm (as measured by sales) are also not systematically associated with votes against
the remuneration committee report. In short, the results do not indicate that the direct
democracy of ‘say on pay’ is being used to remedy defects in the representative system
of boardroom appointments.
Turning to the main variable of interest, Table 3 column (1) shows that voting dissent
is higher where levels of remuneration are higher, ceteris paribus. This would indicate
that at least some shareholders object to levels of pay that they perceive to be excessive,
given the performance of the firm. Note however, that the magnitude of the correlation
is small - a 10% increase in salary corresponds to an increase in voting dissent of
approximately 0.2 percentage points.
In columns (2)-(4) we investigate the extent to which the correlation between remuner-
ation dissent, remuneration and shareholder returns have changed following the onset
of the financial crisis. Various potential break point years are tested. The results
would indicate that there has been no structural break in the underlying relationship.17
Thus observed increases in dissent are associated with changes in the level of correlated
variables rather than a change in the correlation between them over time.
In Table 4 we examine how the correlations vary across the quantiles of dissent. This
gives a more nuanced picture. Dissent is particularly highly correlated with pay at
its higher quantiles, although here the negative correlation of shareholder returns with
dissent is also much greater. At low levels of dissent, the size of the firm is positively
correlated with votes against, whilst at high levels of dissent the opposite holds. Again
we examine whether there is any indication of a change in correlations in the period
after 2007 and, in general, there are no strong indications that this is the case, although
there is an increase association between remuneration and dissent at the 25th percentile
which is significant at the 5% level.
17p-values for the relevant F-test are 0.174, 0.346 and 0.609 respectively.
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2.3. Does dissent moderate pay?
The results discussed so far would suggests that large pay awards are correlated with an
increase in votes against the report of the remuneration committee. It is an interesting
question as to whether this dissent leads to the moderation of pay awards in the following
year. To examine this we estimate an equation in which remuneration18 is regressed
on lagged dissent, plus a vector of control variables that are standard in the CEO
remuneration literature- these include the age of the CEO, sales, shareholder return,
board composition and variables describing equity ownership. The results are given in
Table 5.
In our sample, higher levels of executive remuneration are highly correlated with to-
tal shareholder return. This suggests a strong link between pay and performance for
chief executives. Among the other control variables, firm size (log sales) produces the
expected large positive impact on remuneration, with an elasticity (0.203) lying within
the range established in prior literature (Murphy, 1999). Having controlled for size, the
number of non-executive directors is positively correlated with remuneration casting
some doubt on their efficacy in constraining any executive rent-seeking behaviour.
The level of dissent in the previous year is a statistically significant determinant of
remuneration. In Table 5 we allow the impact of dissent to differ above and below
the mean level of dissent but fitting a spline with a knot at 10%. Below this level of
dissent, remuneration and dissent are positively correlated, above this level of dissent
pay has a moderating impact on pay. To investigate this issue further, we present
quantile regression estimates in columns (3) to (7) of Table 5. These results serve to
reinforce the basic regression results. At all levels of remuneration, low levels of dissent
do nothing to restrain the remuneration of CEOs, and may act as an encouragement to
18The measure of pay is the expected value of the compensation package in the year it was granted.
The model is estimated from 2003 onwards, since prior to this remuneration report voting was on a
voluntary basis and so self-selection may be an issue.
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Table 5: Quantile regression estimates of the impact of dissent on remuneration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Quantile Quantile
mean mean 10 25 50 75 90 10 25 50 75 90
Dissentt−1 <=10 3.559*** 2.900*** 2.288*** 2.360*** 3.243*** 3.946*** 5.600*** 1.109 1.775*** 3.009*** 3.201*** 6.089***
(0.401) (0.555) (0.659) (0.456) (0.383) (0.530) (0.727) (1.012) (0.627) (0.521) (0.704) (0.981)
Dissentt−1>10 -0.434** -0.327 -0.104 -0.266 -0.396** -0.429* -0.615** -0.164 -0.073 -0.343 -0.401 -0.670
(0.169) (0.251) (0.278) (0.192) (0.162) (0.223) (0.307) (0.457) (0.283) (0.236) (0.318) (0.443)
Dissentt−1 <=10 * Post 2007 1.371* 2.031 0.933 0.624 1.382 -0.873
(0.795) (1.449) (0.899) (0.747) (1.008) (1.405)
Dissentt−1 >10 * Post 2007 -0.229 -0.014 -0.223 -0.263 0.002 0.101
(0.340) (0.619) (0.384) (0.319) (0.431) (0.601)
Age 0.172*** 0.170*** 0.164*** 0.091*** 0.063*** 0.047* 0.095** 0.171*** 0.094*** 0.066*** 0.049* 0.088**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.034) (0.023) (0.020) (0.027) (0.037) (0.037) (0.023) (0.019) (0.026) (0.036)
Age squared -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000* -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(sales) 0.203*** 0.203*** 0.257*** 0.232*** 0.212*** 0.185*** 0.162*** 0.254*** 0.233*** 0.214*** 0.188*** 0.160***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.016)
TSR 0.224*** 0.223*** 0.212*** 0.230*** 0.230*** 0.238*** 0.222*** 0.234*** 0.225*** 0.223*** 0.233*** 0.210***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.056) (0.039) (0.033) (0.045) (0.062) (0.062) (0.039) (0.032) (0.043) (0.061)
no. non-executive directors 0.112*** 0.111*** 0.087*** 0.101*** 0.108*** 0.124*** 0.125*** 0.085*** 0.099*** 0.106*** 0.122*** 0.124***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012)
no. executive directors 0.006 0.006 -0.013 -0.017* -0.011 0.017 0.018 -0.017 -0.014 -0.010 0.019* 0.018
(0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014)
% insiders 0.094 0.092 0.260 0.439*** 0.288*** 0.115 -0.261 0.294* 0.457*** 0.265*** 0.070 -0.301*
(0.096) (0.097) (0.158) (0.110) (0.092) (0.127) (0.175) (0.176) (0.109) (0.091) (0.122) (0.171)
Constant 4.135*** 4.177*** 2.887** 4.875*** 6.473*** 7.303*** 6.888*** 2.750** 4.758*** 6.376*** 7.252*** 7.143***
(0.836) (0.836) (1.159) (0.802) (0.674) (0.932) (1.280) (1.290) (0.800) (0.665) (0.897) (1.251)
Observations 2,964 2,964 2,964 2,964 2,964 2,964 2,964 2,964 2,964 2,964 2,964 2,964
R-squared 0.486 0.486
1. The dependent variable is total remuneration, which comprises salary, perks, bonuses and a grant date value of options and equity incentives.
2. % Dissent is the total number of against and abstain votes divided by the number of votes cast at the meeting.
3. Standard errors in parentheses
4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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increase it. However levels of dissent higher than the mean act as a very real restraint.
These findings are magnified as we move across the pay quantiles. At the 90th centile,
a 10% point increase in registered dissent levels above the mean reduces pay by 6.2%.
We interpret these results as indicating that dissent will only be factored into pay
determination once a threshold level of dissent has been expressed.19 This is consistent
with at least a weak form of the ‘outrage’ constraint proposed by Bebchuk and Fried
(2003, 2004).
In Table 5 we also investigate whether the moderating impact of dissent on trade has
changed following the onset of the financial crisis. Column (2) shows no indication
that the impact of dissent has changed at the mean of remuneration. Columns (8)-(12)
perform a similar exercise at different quantiles of pay. Again there is no indication
that the restraining impact of dissent on pay has increased in the post 2007 period.
3. Conclusion
The current policy debate over shareholders votes on executive remuneration has seen
provisions enacted in an increasing number of countries. Common to all such policies
is the belief that aggrieved shareholders should be able to block excessive remuneration
arrangements, either via generating embarrassment for the executive or, increasingly,
via binding resolution. Such arguments appear justifiable in the light of a number of
well publicized cases of apparent abuse. This paper seeks to provide evidence on the
role that shareholder votes currently plays in constraining compensation. The results
presented in this paper indicate that voting does constrain pay, at least when it exceeds
a threshold of dissent. This effect is increasingly felt across the pay deciles, though the
magnitude of this impact is relatively small. Since our data covers the population of
19This accords with our own conversations with industry practitioners (Manifest, Hay Group, De-
loitte, Towers Watson, Risk Metrics).
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UK firms in the top 350 over the period since the introduction of mandatory voting,
these results must be taken an indicating an important, if limited, role for ‘say on pay’.
However we do not find a strengthening of this impact in the aftermath of the financial
crisis.
Of course, there may also be other indirect benefits to such a policy. The requirement of
a vote does more that put the remuneration report under public scrutiny. It encourages
corporate governance advisers and financial institutions to take a view on appropriate
levels of compensation. Furthermore, some more recent say on pay schemes, including
the Dodd-Frank Act in the USA, which require the publication of financial institution
voting data, may lead to a greater involvement yet of institutional shareholders. This is
certainly envisaged under the FRC (2010b) Stewardship Code for the UK. It may also
be that fear of provoking dissent constrains the remuneration committee, and/or the re-
muneration consultants on whose work the committee draws, to design packages within
acceptable bounds. Indeed, a cynical view of the role of the remuneration consultant
could be that it is to assess the acceptable level of uplift.
It is also true that the subsequent disciplinary aspect of the voting mechanism may work
in ways not pursued in this paper, for example via an increased likelihood of the CEO
leaving the company. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this may be the case with some
senior executives, who have been on the receiving end of shareholder protests, being
‘ousted’ from the board.20 Our data suggests that approximately one-third of executive
directors resign on the day of the AGM. Identifying which of these resignations are the
result of normal turnover, and which are the result of shareholder dissent, is beyond
the scope of this paper. One strategy would be to adopt a survival model within a
competing risks framework, thus allowing for different modes of exit. This remains for
future work.
20One such case is noted in Table 2 where AVIVA CEO Andrew Moss resigned following the AGM.
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Table A.1: Variable Descriptions
Variable Comment
Dissent The number of votes “against” or “abstain” as a percentage of total votes
cast.
Pay Variables Total remuneration comprises salary, perks, bonuses, options and equity in-
centives, expressed in December 2008 prices. The price of these options and
equity incentives are for the day they are granted and taken from the compa-
nies’ annual report and accounts. Figures are pro-rata if served a period other
than 12 months, subject to serving at least 3 months of the financial year.
Total remuneration uses a grant date value of options and equity incentives
(one-third of their face value), rather than their final exercised values.
Sales The log of Sales measured in £000s, annualized and in December 2008 prices.
Insiders The number of executives directors and non-independent non-executive di-
rectors as a percentage of the total number of directors on the board.
No. executive directors The number of executive directors at the financial year end including the
CEO.
No. non-executive directors The number of non-executive directors at the financial year end excluding the
Chairman.
Age The Age of the CEO at the financial year end.
Total Shareholder Return (TSR) The difference in the log of the return index from Thomson Datastream. The
return index captures both the movement in share price and income from
dividends.
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